The internet of things (IoT) is emerging as the next mega-trend technology across the business spectrum. Due to significant advances in sensor and RFID technologies, smart devices are now connected via the internet and able to communicate with each other without human intervention. Hence, the amount of data collected about individuals has increased dramatically. The ability of machines and sensor devices to collect, transmit and share data has raised privacy concerns in IoT applications. Recently, privacy concerns about data collected by IoT applications have received an increasing amount of attention. Therefore, a series of security mechanisms must be available for data privacy protection. In this paper, we propose two secure correlation computation protocols for IoT applications. We concentrate on the asymmetric setting where only one party receives the computation result. We incorporate homomorphic cryptosystem into our computation to support operations in an encrypted form. Two experimental results in this paper demonstrate the performance of both computation protocols.
Introduction
The internet of things (IoT) is now an emerging global internet-based information architecture used to facilitate the exchange of goods and services (Ashton, 2009) . IoT has emerged as the next mega-trend technology across business spectrum in the information industry (Li Da, 2011) . The concept of IoT can be considered as a continuation of the internet evolution since it allows living objects (humans or animals), devices (sensor) or object with embedded technologies to automatically transfer data over a communication networks (wired or wireless networks) without human-to-human or human-to-computer interaction (Peraković et al., 2014) . It is aimed to utilise and extend the benefits of internet such as always-on, data sharing and remote access capabilities (Yen and Kuo, 2012) .
A simple and commonly used definition of IoT is as follows (Atzori et al., 2010) : "The basic idea of this concept is the pervasive presence around us of a variety of things or objects-such as Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc. -which, through unique addressing schemes, are able to interact with each other and cooperate with their neighbors to reach common goals".
IoT requires data sharing in every aspect of our life. For instance, data collected from smart metering application can be used by the utility provider to analyse and improve its services. Also, these data can help the user to aware about their energy consumptions and possible energy saving strategies. In an underwater environment, smart meter is particularly important because information can be detected, gathered, and sent to the sensor (Dhurandher et al., 2012) .
The ability of machines and sensor devices to detect the environment changes and communicate with each other allows them to provide autonomic responses to complex situations without human intervention. For example, smart devices in our daily life such as smart refrigerator and smart phones are equipped with sensors and internet connection. These devices can collect and share the data with the user or other IoT applications in order to generate autonomic responses. This capability often involves real time data collection, data transmission and data sharing. Due to the advances of sensor technology, the amount of data collected about individuals has increased dramatically. These collected data are useful for real-time response (e.g., traffic analysis and inventory control) and offline analysis (e.g., finds pattern via data mining tools).
Privacy issues are now a major challenge for IoT applications because the IoT are often associated with individuals. The leakage of privacy-sensitive information (e.g., GPS location and RFID tags data) can compromise one's privacy. Therefore, an important aspect of study in IoT application is how the data collected from its user is used and processed.
In real-life scenarios, correlation between data gathered from different sensors is useful for different analysis. A correlation coefficient is a statistical method to measure the degree of a linear relationship between two variables that either move together (positive relationship), or inversely (negative relationship), or are not related at all (no relationship).
Motivation and problem statement
Finding correlation or association between two variables is an important task in many areas such as business finance, economics, and medical science. For example, correlation coefficient is used in financial industry to measure the strength of influence between two market assets (e.g., gold and silver prices). In medical research, practitioners often use correlation analysis to study the patterns, causes, and effects of health and disease conditions. Generally, correlation analysis allows us to further define the pattern of the existing relationship (Taylor, 1990 ). Let's consider the case where there are two companies A and B, with shared customers. Each company only has partial information from their customers. Due to competition and concerns regarding privacy, both companies might refuse to share their data with each other. However, it is necessary for both parties to share their data if they both, would like to discover the correlation between their customers' datasets (e.g., correlation between age and salary). When the sensitive data are used for the correlation computation, security and privacy concerns will become a crucial issue among the collaborators, i.e., no party is willing to reveal their private input to another party. Hence, a series of security mechanisms must be available in order to guarantee the correctness and the privacy protection.
For IoT applications, correlation coefficient is useful when we want to assess the variation of two sensors data. In particular, how much the readings of a sensor vary from another nearby sensor. For example, smart traffic control system can analysis the traffic condition based on the correlation information computed from two or more sensors. Since most of the information in an IoT application is personal data, there is a need to protect these data during the correlation coefficient computation.
Our contributions
In this paper, we propose two secure protocols to protect data used in IoT applications. Instead of placing full trust on a trusted third party, we require the parties (i.e., a client and a server) to perform computation over the encrypted data. We summarise our contributions as follows:
1 We present two secure protocols to compute Spearman's rho rank correlation coefficient for IoT-related applications. Our protocol is asymmetric case where only one party (i.e., client) receives the output at the end of the protocol execution while the other party (i.e., server) learns nothing.
2 In our protocol design, both players are constrained to ensure that no extra information will be revealed other than the computed result (privacy is protected) and further, the output of the protocol is according to the prescribed functionality (correctness is guaranteed). In order to achieve these requirements, we utilise an additive homomorphic cryptosystem in the computation.
Organisation of the paper
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the background and related work for this research is in Section 2 and the technical preliminaries are described in Section 3. We present our secure computation protocols in Section 4 followed by the analysis and the discussions in Section 5. Our conclusion is in Section 6.
Background and related work

Data privacy for IoT
In 1973, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare proposed Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) as the guideline to assure fair practice and adequate data privacy protection. In particular, the guideline aims to protect the consumer rights such as how online entities should collect and use the personal data (Teraoka, 2012) . There are several privacy implications arising when the sensors collect, transmit and share data in IoT applications. For example, it is necessary to preserve location privacy because it is possible to infer the location of an individual from things which are associated with the target user. Since much of the data in IoT are personal data, it is important to protect them when they are used for real-time responses or analysis.
Since the sensors are designed to collect data automatically, we can expect that IoT applications are generally not able to meet privacy requirements. Therefore, we argue that there must be a series of mechanism to guarantee the privacy protection in IoT applications.
Correlation coefficient
There are two main types of correlation coefficient: Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient (r) and Spearman's (1904) rank correlation coefficient (r s ). The usage of these correlation coefficients depends on the types of variables being studied. For instance, r is used when both variables being studied are normally distributed (i.e., interval or ratio data) whereas r s is used when one or both variables are not normally distributed (i.e., skewed data). Another popular measurement for not normally distributed data is Kendall's (1938) 
Spearman's rho is often considered as the regular Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient, in terms of the proportion of variability accounted for, whereas τ measures the difference between the probabilities of the datasets when they are in the same and different order (Puka, 2011 ). An extensive study for the relationship between r s and τ can be found in (Fredricks and Nelsen, 2007) . Although beyond the scope of this paper, different formulas exist to calculate the correlation coefficient depending upon the nature of the variables. In this paper, we will use Spearman's rho as our measurement metric.
Spearman's rho computation
Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , …, a n } and B = {b 1 , b 2 , …, b n } be two private datasets and {(a i , b i )| i = 1, 2, …, n} as i th data pair that consists of a i ∈ A and b i ∈ B. First, data in A and B is sorted and ranked, from 1 (highest rank) to n (lowest rank). If there exists a tied rank, the mean rank will be used to replace the original rank. Let X and Y denote the ranked dataset for A and B, respectively. The difference between X and Y for each (a i , b i ) is computed. Then, the Spearman's rho rank correlation coefficient, r s for A and B can be computed by using the following equation:
( ) 
To illustrate further, let assume two datasets A = {3, 6, 6, 7} and B = {9, 12, 15, 15}. The computation of ranking data (x i and y i ) and their differences (d i ) are shown in Table 1 . As shown in Table 1 , a 2 and a 3 have a tied ranking. Therefore, we will use their mean rank (2 + 3) / 2 = 2.5 to replace the original rank (i.e., 2 and 3, respectively). The same technique will be used for tied ranking in Y. After summing the squared of differences between rankings, we will obtain 2 1 1.5. 
Related work
There are two possible approaches can be used to securely compute Spearman's rho correlation coefficient between two parties. The first approach is based on the secure multi-party computation (i.e., circuit evaluation) which was first studied by Yao (1982) . His idea is to allow two individuals to compare their richness without revealing their wealth to each other. Since then, many secure computation protocols have been proposed in the literature. As proved by Goldreich et al. (1987) , there exists a secure solution for any functionality which can be represented as a combinatorial circuit. However, the circuit evaluation is somehow inefficient for large number of parties.
The second approach is based on some cryptographic techniques, particularly on the homomorphic-based cryptosystem. By using the homomorphic cryptosystem, computations can be performed in an encrypted form. Hence, the privacy of the private inputs used can be protected.
For IoT applications, the correlation computation is often performed without considering the data privacy protection. The current approaches are more focusing on the accuracy and the data mining results from a vast amount of data collected from different sensors or environments rather than how to protect user's personal data during the computation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no solution that has been proposed previously to compute correlation for IoT applications such as Spearman's rho in a private environment.
Our work in this paper is based on the homomorphic cryptosystem. We utilise additive property to design two secure protocols for Spearman's rho. We will discuss the details of our protocol design in Section 4.
Technical preliminaries
Secure two-party computation
Generally, a two-party computation problem is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (Goldreich, 2005) . Let Π be a protocol between the client (with input x) and the server (with input y). Then, we denote the client's output by Π c (x, y) and the server's output by Π s (x, y). Since only the client gets the output in our case, we can simply denote Π(x, y) = Π c (x, y). The view for the client and the server during the execution of protocol Π on input (x, y) can be denoted as Π VIEW ( , ), c x y and Π VIEW ( , ), s x y respectively. Note that the view for each party includes their local input, output and messages received from another party.
Adversary model
We assume both the client and the server are semi-honest parties. In the semi-honest model, both parties follow the prescribed actions in the protocol, but might attempt to discover extra information from the intermediate results during the computation. We do not consider a malicious model in our protocol because a malicious adversary can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol (Li et al., 2005) .
Security definition
We now formally define the security definition for our protocols as follows (adapted from (Goldreich, 2004) :
n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a probabilistic polynomial-time function. We say that a two-party computation protocol π securely computes f in the presence of semi-honest adversaries if the following holds: circuits. We refer reader to (Goldreich, 2004) for the definition of computational indistinguishability.
Additive homomorphic cryptosystem
We use additive property from the homomorphic encryption scheme [i.e., Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999) ] as our primary cryptographic tool. Let Enc pk (m) denote the encryption of m with the public key, pk. Given two ciphertexts Enc pk (m 1 ) and Enc pk (m 2 ), there exists an efficient algorithm + h to compute Enc pk (m 1 + m 2 ). This additive property can be computed without the knowledge of the decryption key Dec pk . Note that when a scheme supports the additive operation, it also supports scalar multiplication because Enc pk (c · m 1 ) can be achieved by summing Enc pk (m 1 ) successively c times. We require that the additive homomorphic cryptosystem used in our protocol is semantically-secure (Goldwasser and Micali, 1984) , i.e., a random number will be used for each encryption. This is to ensure that the encryption of two same plaintexts will not produce two identical ciphertexts.
Our proposed protocols
Our protocols design in this paper followed the standard definition of secure two-party computation security that aims to fulfil some security properties. A secure two-party computation must ensure that the correctness of the output can be guaranteed while the data privacy is protected. In order to protect the privacy for each party, we require our protocols to perform computation over the encrypted data. Hereafter in this section, we assume the client and the server are two separate sensors.
In our protocol design, we assume that the dataset from both parties is of equal length with distinct values and that there exists an authentication channel for encryption key and data transmission. At the end of the protocol execution, the client learns the computation result (i.e., r s ) while the server learns nothing.
Protocol idea
The main idea for our proposed solution is to allow one party (the client) to learn the output of the protocol while another party (the server) learns nothing at the end of the protocol execution. The computation should be performed in the absence of the TTP.
At the preliminary phase, the client C generates a Paillier cryptosystem key pair (pk C¸ pr C ) and sends the encryption key pk c to the server S. For simplicity, let assume X and Y are ranking datasets computed from dataset D C and D S belong to C and S, respectively.
Protocol with n-encrypted outputs
In this session, we first describe our protocol which outputs n encrypted data to the client C. The client is required to perform n decryption in order to obtain the final result.
Phase 1 C encrypts each ranking value x i ∈ X by using pk C (e.g.,
Phase 2 S changes the sign for each ranking value y i ∈ Y and encrypts them by using pk C (e.g., 
Protocol with single encrypted output
In order to reduce the computation time (i.e., decryption costs) of the client, we modify our protocol such that the server helps the client to produce only single encrypted output. 
Analysis
In both protocols, only C can decrypt the encrypted results since the decryption key pr C is known only by the client. Also, S is not able to distinguish which ciphertext is the encryption result of the same rank data because Paillier is semantically secure (Goldwasser and Micali, 1982) , such that the encryption of the same message will produce different ciphertexts due to randomisation in the encryption process. Hence, the server learns nothing about X by knowing ( ).
pk Enc X ′ C
Analysis of security
To show the security of our protocols, we sketch how to simulate the view of the client and the server using its respective inputs and outputs. Firstly, let S c simulate all internal coin flips of the client as described in our protocol and also simulates an encrypted data from the server to the client in the phase 3. Next, let S s simulate all internal coin flips of the server as described in our protocol. Also, it simulates n ciphertexts from the client to the server. Therefore, the computational indistinguishability immediately holds.
In our protocols, the server follows the prescribed protocol but may curious to learn extra information about the client's data. After participating the protocol, the server has the encrypted dataset of the client ( ) 
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C by comparing the two ciphertexts. Furthermore, the server is not able to decrypt any data from the client because it has no knowledge about the client's decryption key. Hence, the client's privacy is protected. In another hand, the client receives single encrypted data from the server in phase 4. The client learns the output after the decryption operation. It cannot learn anything on the server's input. As such, the server's privacy is protected.
Analysis of complexity
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of our proposed protocols in terms of the overall computation cost by both parties. The computation cost for our protocols is dominated by cryptographic operations such as encryption, homomorphic addition, homomorphic scalar multiplication and decryption. We ran an experiment (on a machine with 2.67 GHz CPU and 4GB memory) to demonstrate the performance comparison.
As shown in Figure 1 , the computation time for both protocols is linear within the dataset size. As expected, the computation time for protocol with n decryptions is almost double as compared with the protocol with single decryption. The performance of our protocol can be improved by using a preprocessing approach. For instance, we can store the private dataset in an encrypted form. Hence, the computation time during the protocol execution can be reduced significantly. 
Discussion and conclusions
Rank correlation coefficient is a statistical analysis used to measure the strength of an association (statistical dependence) between two variables. For instance, we can use rank correlation coefficient to assess how much the readings of a sensor vary in response to the variation in the readings of other sensors. Privacy issues is now a major challenge for IoT applications since data collected from the IoT are often associated with individuals. Since the sensors are designed to collect data automatically, we can expect that IoT applications are generally not able to meet privacy requirements. The leakage of personal data such as GPS location and RFID tags information can compromise one's privacy. Therefore, there must be a series of mechanism to guarantee the privacy protection in IoT applications.
In this paper, we have proposed two secure protocols to compute Spearman's rho rank correlation coefficient. Our protocols can be used for any IoT applications to protect both raw and ranked data collected by the sensors. Note that our solution can be extended to support other correlation computation such as Pearson and Kendall's tau (Wong et al., 2015) .
